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11 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Helms (~~EYES ONLY~~)

FROM :

SUBJECT : Your Memorandum Relaying Shah's Statement
Concerning Barzani

1. Thank you for passing to me what the Shah advised Barzani about joining a Ba'ath-Communist coalition: "Do so if you want to commit suicide!"

2. The Kurds have reported the visit of the two Soviet Embassy officers to us and to the Iranians. We have advised them always to report all their Soviet contacts promptly and fully to the Iranians so as to lessen the possibility that the Iranians will suspect Barzani of playing a double game.

3. Attached is a summary of what they told us. We sent it to headquarters on 9 June for dissemination in order to conceal the place acquired. Normally I would have had it to you sooner but, as you noted, this has been a standard Soviet approach and the Kurdish reaction was in line with their previous responses. The report was obtained by me in Arabic and had to be translated.

Attachment:
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

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HR70-14
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1. ON 2 JUNE 73, BOTH VICTOR (N. VICTOR ABUSOV A L B U K) THE FIRST SECRETARY, AND IR IGOR (P E T R A K O V), THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD, PAID A VISIT TO THE KURDISH AREA. THEY SAID THEY WERE ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET COMMAND INCLUDING BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, AND PODGORNYY. THEY SAID THE OBJECTIVE OF ~~IR~~ THEIR TRIP WAS TO ASCERTAIN THE FEELINGS OF MULLA MUSTAFA ~~BARZANI~~ BARZANI AND THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE KDP, AND TO ~~ASCERTAIN~~ OBTAIN THE OPINIONS OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT AND THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN GENERAL, AND THE OPINION OF BARZANI IN PARTICULAR. JUDGING BY THEIR POSITION AND THEIR COMMENTS, HOWEVER, THEIR REAL OBJECTIVE WAS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON BARZANI TO COOPERATE WITH AND TO RECONCILE HIM-

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... THE NATIONAL FRONT ALONG
... COMMUNIST PARTIES ACCORDING
... NATIONALIST, AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST ... ETC.
... ALSO BE A FIRM ALLY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY
EMPHASIZED IN PARTICULAR THEIR SUPPORT FOR MR. SADDAM HUSAYN
AL-TIKRITI AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE KURDS ALSO TO GIVE HIM
THEIR COOPERATION AND BACKING IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET OFFICERS SPOKE AT LENGTH
ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION VIEWS IRAQ
AND THE KURDISH QUESTION, AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING
THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THE
COMMUNISTS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A UNIFIED AND ANTI-IMPERIAL-
IST IRAQI FRONT. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO ASSIST
THE KURDISH PEOPLE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND IN VARIOUS AREAS,
AFTER THEY HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE IRAQI GOVERN-
MENT.

3. MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI AND THE POLITICAL BUREAU SPOKE
WITH THEM AT LENGTH ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE BA'TH AND THE
CURRENT POINTS OF FRICTION SUCH AS THE ARABIZATION PROGRAM;

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THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH BORDERS FOR THE KURDISH AREA; THE LACK OF KURDISH PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT; THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST BARZANI; AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH INDICATE THE ABSENCE OF ANY BA'ATHI GOOD INTENTIONS. ALL THIS HAS LED TO A TOTAL LOSS OF KURDISH CONFIDENCE IN THE BA'ATH REGIME AND ITS ABILITY TO SETTLE THE KURDISH QUESTION. THE KURDISH VIEW ~~AS~~ WAS EXPOUNDED IN DETAIL, AND THE SOVIET EMISSARIES PROMISED TO PASS IT ON AS THEY HEARD IT TO THE SOVIET LEADERS WHO HAD SENT THEM.

4. THE SOVIET OFFICIALS DID NOT BRING ANY PRACTICAL OR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS WITH THEM TO BE ADOPTED BY THE KURDS OR BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE KURDISH ISSUE. THEIR REMARKS CENTERED ON PRESSURING BARZANI TO AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH SADDAM HUSAYN AL-TIKRITI AND THE REGIME AND TO JOIN THE NATIONAL FRONT WITH THE BA'ATH AND THE COMMUNISTS. THE TWO DIPLOMATS CARRIED AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SOVIET ~~E~~ COMMAND FOR BARZANI; THEY ALSO CARRIED A WRITTEN OUTLINE OF THE MAJOR POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED AS OUTLINED ABOVE. THEY BOTH SAID THAT THE REGIME HAD ~~A~~ MADE A DECISION TO GIVE THE KURDISH PEOPLE AUTONOMOUS ~~RE~~ RULE BEFORE THE 11TH OF MARCH

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AND THEY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE KURDS
AND APPROPRIATELY TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER.

5. SOURCE COMMENT: ONE MEMBER OF THE KDP CENTRAL
COMMITTEE CONFRONTED THE SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH THE CHARGE
THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS TRAINING TO USE THE POISON GAS, WHICH
THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUPPLIED TO IRAQ, FOR GENOCIDE AGAINST
THE KURDS. THE SOVIET OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THIS AND
ASKED FOR THE EVIDENCE OR REPORTS ^{ON} WHICH THE KURDISH
INFORMATION WAS BASED. THE KURDISH OFFICIAL SAID THE INFOR-
MATION WAS RELIABLE AND CONVINCING TO THE KURDS AND THAT HE
DID NOT PROPOSE TO DISCLOSE ITS SOURCE TO THE SOVIETS. THE
SOVIET UNION IS IN A POSITION TO KNOW THAT IT ~~XXXXX~~ IS TRUE.

6. SOURCE COMMENT: THE SOVIETS LEFT THE BARZANI AREA
ON 5 JUNE. BARZANI EXPRESSED CONCERN TO SOME OF HIS SENIOR
KURDISH ADVISORS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY EVENTUALLY GIVE THE
IRAQI REGIME ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR A MILITARY CAMPAIGN TO
CRUSH THE KURDS. THE SOVIET VISITORS COMMENTED THAT THE
IRANIANS AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN SECRET
DIPLOMATIC TALKS AND WHAT ~~X~~ DID THE KURDS THINK THIS IMPLIED
FOR THEM. THE KDP LEADERS REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER

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BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS AND DID NOT CONCERN THEM. IN FACT,
HOWEVER, THEY HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE TALKS AND HAD BEEN SOME-
WHAT CONCERNED THAT IF THE IRANIANS COULD SECURE THEIR
DEMANDS OVER THE SHATT-AL-ARAB THEY ^{MIGHT} MUST CEASE OR REDUCE
THEIR SUPPORT FOR BARZANI. THE RESUMPTION OF IRANIAN
PROPAGANDA AGAINST IRAQ ABOUT 5 JUNE TENDED TO REASSURE
THE KURDS THAT THEY WOULD NOT LOSE IRANIAN SUPPORT.

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